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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to quantify the crowding-out effect of public debt and the related loss in long-
run output in neoclassical growth models. To accomplish this task, we incorporate the govern-
ment sector into the Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans (RCK) model, the Blanchard model and the Solow
model, which differ only in their assumptions concerning the consumption behaviour of house-
holds. We also introduce a general framework that is capable of gauging the burden of public
debt in a neoclassical world in the case of any type of consumption behaviour. Our results are
threefold. First, contrary to the RCK model, public debt reduces long-run output in the Blanchard
model and the Solow model, although to a different extent: the crowding-out effect is marginal
in the former, whereas it can be very large in the latter. Second, the burden of public debt is
country-specific depending crucially on the saving rate and the population growth rate. Finally, in
developed countries the upper limit of the output loss related to public debt is moderate at best
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I. Introduction
This paper investigates the burden of public debt
in neoclassical growth models. Our goal is to
quantify the crowding out of physical capital by
public debt and the related loss in long-run output
under different assumptions regarding the con-
sumption behaviour of households. The relevance
of the issue can be traced back to the historical
indebtedness of developed countries in the wake
of the latest global financial crisis (Figure 1). There
is much concern that the high public debt-to-GDP
ratios, which are not expected to decrease signifi-
cantly in the foreseeable future, will have adverse
effects on growth prospects (Reinhart and Rogoff
2013). Moreover, in the recent past, a common
argument against fiscal easing in the core coun-
tries in the frame of the euro area crisis manage-
ment was the possible negative effect of public
debt on economic growth.
There are many channels through which public
debt might affect economic output either positively
or negatively. The most frequently cited negative
effect is the crowding out of private investments
(Elmendorf and Mankiw 1999). A further adverse
effect is macroeconomic vulnerability. Two major
positive effects of public debt are the Keynesian effect
and the hysteresis effect, which refer to the ability of
expansionary fiscal policy to mitigate both the actual
rate and the natural rate of unemployment during
recessions (DeLong and Summers 2012). To sum up,
the main message of economic theory is that the
debt–growth nexus is country- and time-specific,
being conditional on several factors, such as the busi-
ness cycle and institutional quality (e.g. Krugman
2012; Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano 2003). This
conditionality of the debt–growth nexus is also con-
firmed by the latest empirical results (e.g. Eberhardt
and Presbitero 2015; Égert 2015).
Given the importance of the issue, it is urgent
that economic theory improves our understanding
of the complex relationship between public debt
and economic growth. Our paper contributes to
this mission by thoroughly investigating the mag-
nitude of the crowding-out effect of public debt
under different consumption behaviours. The
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framework of the analysis is provided by three
basic neoclassical growth models: the Ramsey–
Cass–Koopmans (henceforth RCK) model
(Ramsey 1928; Cass 1965; Koopmans 1965), the
Blanchard model (Blanchard 1985) and the Solow
model (Solow 1956). We start with the RCK
model and assume that households pursue
dynamic optimization and are connected by
altruistic intergenerational links. The RCK model
and its implications concerning the effect of public
debt are well understood in the literature, so we
discuss them only briefly to provide a theoretical
baseline for the subsequent analyses. After the
RCK model, we drop the assumption of interge-
nerational links in the Blanchard model and also,
later, the assumption of dynamic optimization in
the Solow model. In each case, we consider a
closed economy, assume exogenous technological
change, and focus on the long run.
Of course, we are not the first to investigate the
crowding-out effect of public debt in neoclassical
growth models. In his seminal paper, Diamond
(1965) deals with the effect of public debt in a
life-cycle OLG model. Based on the Diamond
model, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) reveal sig-
nificant crowding out of private investments by
public debt. Inspired by the results of life-cycle
models, Barro (1974) demonstrates that if inter-
generational links prevail, government bonds do
not represent net wealth for the households and
therefore Ricardian equivalence holds. Blanchard
(1985) constructs an OLG model that neglects the
life-cycle aspect of life in a continuous time setting
in order to provide a tractable framework for
analysing the effect of public debt on long-run
output when the time horizon of households is
finite. Weil (1989) and Buiter (1988) reveal that
the failure of Ricardian equivalence in the
Blanchard model is caused by the disconnected-
ness of new and old dynasties and not by the finite
time horizon of households. Ball and Mankiw
(1995) introduce the parable of the debt fairy, a
back-of-the-envelope-type calculation of the bur-
den of public debt in the Solow model.
The main contribution of the paper to the debt–
growth debate is to provide an overview on the mag-
nitude of the crowding-out effect as a function of
households’ behaviour in a neoclassical growth fra-
mework. Although our knowledge about consump-
tion and saving has improved a lot, there is still
considerable confusion about the extent to which
intergenerational links and dynamic optimization
might characterize the behaviour of households
(Romer 2012). Thus, to provide an approximate
range on the possible burden of public debt is of
first-order importance from the point of view of
economic policy. Our results show that in a neoclas-
sical world the long-run output loss related to public
debt can vary on a large scale. Beyond this major
policy conclusion, the paper also provides three addi-
tional contributions to the theory. First, it is often
argued that the burden of public debt through distor-
tionary taxation can be considerable (e.g. Mankiw
2000). We prove that in fact this is not true, at least
Figure 1. The ratio of public debt to the GDP in some developed countries (%).
Source: AMECO Database
Notes: General government consolidated gross debt
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in the RCKmodel. Second, we present a new formula
for the crowding-out effect in the Blanchard model
according to which it is straightforward to perform
the calculation. Third, we introduce a general frame-
work that is capable of gauging the burden of public
debt in a neoclassical world in the case of any type of
households’ consumption behaviour.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 discusses briefly the role of
public debt in the RCK model. Section 3 considers
the crowding-out effect and the resulting output
loss in the Blanchard model, while section 4 dis-
cusses these issues in the Solow model. Section 5
provides the general framework for examining the
burden of public debt in neoclassical growth mod-
els. Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. Government debt in the Ramsey–Cass–
Koopmans model
This section investigates the impact of government
debt on steady-state output in the RCK model
(Ramsey 1928; Cass 1965; Koopmans 1965). We
consider a closed economy that consists of three
sectors: households, firms, and government.
The representative household supplies labour
inelastically and decides only on consumption.
As intergenerational links are operative, house-






0 u cðtÞ½ e
nteρtdt; (1)
where ρ is the subjective discount rate, c ¼ C=L is
the per capita consumption, C is the aggregate
consumption, LðtÞ ¼ ent is the population growing
at rate n and ρ > n. The initial value of the popu-
lation is normalized to one: For simplicity, we
assume the logarithmic utility func-
tion: uðcÞ ¼ lnðcÞ.
The households’ flow budget constraint is
_aðtÞ ¼ ð1 τWÞwðtÞ þ ð1 τAÞrðtÞaðtÞ
 naðtÞ  cðtÞ; (2)
where a and w are the per capita assets and wage,
respectively, r is the interest rate, and τW and τA
are the tax rates levied on wage income and capital
income. The dot above the variables denotes deri-
vation with respect to time. Because the economy
is closed, the total assets (A ¼ aL) equal the sum
of physical capital (K) and government debt
(B): A ¼ K þ B.
The intensive form of the Y ¼ F K; ELð Þ neo-
classical production function is ŷ ¼ f ðk̂Þ, where
ŷ ¼ Y=ðELÞ, k̂ ¼ K=ðELÞ, Y is the output, and E ¼
egt is the level of technology growing at a constant
exogenous rate of g.1 Firms are supposed to oper-
ate in competitive markets; thus, production fac-
tors are rewarded by their marginal products:
r þ δ ¼ @f ðk̂Þ=@k̂ ¼ f 0ðk̂Þ and; ŵ ¼ f ðk̂Þ  k̂f 0ðk̂Þ (3)
where δ is the depreciation rate of physical capital
and ŵ is the wage per effective labour.2
The government collects revenues by imposing
taxes on labour and capital income, while its out-
lays consist of government expenditures and inter-
est payments on debt. For simplicity, the
consumption tax is neglected. Thus, the govern-
ment obeys the following flow budget constraint:
_BðtÞ ¼ rðtÞBðtÞ þ GðtÞ  τWWðtÞ
 τArðtÞðKðtÞ þ BðtÞÞ
¼ rðtÞBðtÞ  ΓRCKðtÞ (4)
where G is government expenditures, W is aggre-
gate wages, and ΓRCK ¼ τWW þ τArA G is the
primary balance of the budget.
For simplicity, government expenditures are
assumed to affect neither the utility of house-
holds nor the production of firms. Government
expenditures as a share of GDP (ϕ ¼ GðtÞ=YðtÞ)
are considered to be constant, therefore tax rates
are also constant for any given debt-to-GDP
ratio. In other words, tax rates are set to run
the necessary primary budget surplus in order to
achieve the target of the government for the
long-run debt-to-GDP ratio. Of course, the lat-
ter implies that larger government debt results
1Releasing the exogeneity of technological change may alter the results on the burden of public debt to some extent since capital intensity (K/Y) positively
covaries with the technological level (Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare 1997). This implies that higher public debt might lead to lower per capita income not
just through the crowding out of physical capital but through the lower level of technology as well. Therefore, endogenous technological change provides
an additional channel through which the burden of public debt can manifest itself. However, the investigation of this topic is far beyond the scope of the
paper and is the subject of future research.
2In what follows, we neglect the t time index when no confusion emerges.
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in higher tax rates. This increase of tax rates
raises the well-known issue of distortionary
taxation related to public debt.
The crowding out of capital brought about by
distortionary taxes must be treated separately
from the classical crowding-out effect of public
debt. Although the rising tax rates crowd out
capital indirectly, the mechanism is completely
different from the classical crowding-out effect,
which is related to the consumption–saving beha-
viour of households and the wealth effect of gov-
ernment bonds. Consequently, we do not deal
with distortionary taxes triggered by public debt
in the main text of the paper. Nevertheless, an
appendix is devoted to the issue, especially as to
some authors ‘. . .substantial steady-state crowding
out can occur simply because of distortionary
taxation’ (Mankiw 2000, 123). In the appendix,
we demonstrate that in fact this is not the case.
The steady state
The representative household maximizes utility
(equation.1) subject to its budget constraint (equa-
equation.2). The optimal time path of consumption is
_̂c
.
ĉ ¼ 1 τAð Þr  ρ g; (5)
where ĉ ¼ C=ðELÞ. The dynamics of physical capi-
tal (per effective) labour can be derived according
to the households’ budget constraint, taking into
account that _a ¼ _kþ _b, where b ¼ B=L, and using
equations (3) and (4):
_̂
k ¼ ð1 ϕÞf ðk̂Þ  ĉ ðnþ g þ δÞk̂ (6)
The dynamics of the system are determined by
equations (4), (5) and (6). In steady state, ĉ, k̂
and b̂ ¼ B=ðELÞ are constant, which yield the
determining equations of the long-run
equilibrium:









¼ 0 ! ĉ ¼ ð1 ϕÞf ðk̂
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where the asterisk refers to the steady state, μ is
the debt-to-GDP ratio, d is the budget deficit over
the GDP, and gY ¼ g þ n is the steady-state
growth rate of output.3
The intertemporal budget constraint of households
and the government
Based on the solution of the flow budget con-
straint (equation.2.) and the transversality condi-
tion of the dynamic optimization, the











¼ að0Þ þ W  TW; (10)
where rðtÞ ¼ 
t
0 rðsÞds=t, W is the present value of
the wage income and TW is the present value of
the taxes levied on the wages. Regarding the fact
that the value of any asset equals the present value
of its future net incomes, the initial stock of
assets is
að0Þ ¼ kð0Þ þ bð0Þ
¼ 
1
0 RKðtÞ þ RBðtÞ  TKðtÞ  TBðtÞð Þe
ð1τAÞrðtÞtdt
¼ ðRK  TKÞ þ ðRB  TBÞ;
(11)
where Ri is the income earned on asset i
ði ¼ K; BÞ, Ti is the tax imposed on Ri, and Ri
and Ti are the present values of the respective
future asset incomes and taxes. Substituting equa-
tion (11) into equation (10), the intertemporal






¼ kð0Þ þ bð0Þ þ W  TW
¼ ð W þ RK þ RBÞ  ðTW þ TK þ TBÞ (12)
According to equation (12), the present value of
future consumption equals the present value of all
types of future income net of taxes.
To derive the intertemporal budget constraint
of the government (IBCG), one has to first solve
3Strictly speaking, d stands for the operational (inflation-adjusted) rather than the total budget deficit.
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the flow budget constraint (equation.4), then take






þ τArðtÞKðtÞ  GðtÞdt
¼ TW þ TK  G; (13)
where G is the present value of future government
spending. Equation (13) claims that the initial
public debt must equal the present value of future
primary budget surpluses exclusive of the tax rev-
enues from interest payment on government
bonds ðτArBÞ.
5 As the initial value of population
is normalized to one, the equation also determines
the initial per capita debt ðbð0Þ ¼ Bð0ÞÞ.
The effect of public debt on steady-state output
To find out how public debt affects steady-state
output, we must combine the government’s inter-
temporal budget constraint with that of the repre-
sentative household. To do so, substitute equation




 ð1τAÞrðtÞn½ tdt ¼ W þ RK  G (14)
Equation (14) conveys the key results of the RCK
model with regard to the impact of public debt on
steady-state output. First, the present value of
future incomes stemming from government
bonds disappears from the intertemporal budget
constraint; that is, government bonds do not
represent net wealth for households (Barro
1974). Second, government purchases enter in
place of taxes.
If taxes were lump-sum, the preceding two
points would imply that only the magnitude of
government purchases, but not their financing
method, affects the consumption of households
and thereby the steady-state output.
Consequently, the Ricardian equivalence holds:
public debt is neutral to long-run output. On the
other hand, if taxes are proportional, as in our
case, the above considerations continue to hold
almost completely. As equation (14) shows, gov-
ernment bonds still do not represent net wealth
for households. However, the financing of govern-
ment expenditures is no longer neutral. If govern-
ment expenditures are financed temporarily by
budget deficit, tax rate will be higher after the
debt-to-GDP ratio stabilizes again at its new
long-run value. Higher tax rate on capital income
results in higher interest rate and thus in lower
steady-state capital and income (equation.7).
Nonetheless, in the appendix, we demonstrate
that the output loss triggered by distortionary
taxes stemming from government debt amounts
to only a few percentage points.
III. Public debt in the Blanchard model
The results of the RCK model depend crucially on
the assumed behaviour of households. However,
intergenerational links and dynamic optimization
can both be challenged by the empirics. As regards
the intergenerational links, ‘. . .many people leave
no bequest and, therefore, are not economically
linked to future generations’ (Mankiw 1995, 279).
Moreover, even if bequests are present, they are
unintended in many cases; that is, altruism does
not play a role in determining them (Bernheim
1987). Thus, in this section, we drop the assump-
tion of intergenerational links and investigate the
effect of public debt on long-run output in the
OLG model of Blanchard (1985).
The structure of the economy is the same as in
the RCK model. The only difference is the lack of
intergenerational links. In OLG models, indivi-
duals do not care about the utility of their descen-
dants and make consumption decisions solely with
respect to their own life cycle. This means that
individuals optimize their consumption on finite
time horizons. We only introduce the main struc-
ture of the model.6
Let p be the probability of death per unit of
time, which is independent of age. Then, the prob-
ability of a person born at time j being alive at
time t > j is epðtjÞ. The expected lifetime is 1/p.
4The NPG condition is lim
t!1
BðtÞeð1τAÞrðtÞt ¼ 0.
5The IBCG is fulfilled if the debt-to-GDP ratio is stable at an arbitrary level (Greiner 2011). Concerning the debt-trajectories of some highly indebted
developed countries it is obvious that they are struggling to comply with their IBCG. In spite of this, we do not deal with the important issue of debt-
sustainability. Instead, we follow the common practise of the debt-growth literature by supposing that the government is always able to run the necessary
budget surplus to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio at the desired level.
6The full model is provided upon request. See, also Acemoglu (2009, ch.9.8).
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The population grows at a constant n rate, so
L ¼ ent. Given this and the p death rate, the size
of the cohort born at time t is ðnþ pÞent.
Regarding the capital market, savings are held
in the form of life insurance that pays an annuity
(z) over the riskless interest rate (r). If the indivi-
dual dies, his or her assets will be left to the life
insurance company. The expected profit of a life
insurance company at time t with respect to an
individual born at time j and with assets a(j,t) is
πðaðj; tÞÞ ¼ p  aðj; tÞ  z  aðj; tÞ. Thus the zero-
profit requirement of competitive markets ensures
that the annuity must equal the probability of
death: z ¼ p. This implies that the rate of return
on households’ assets is ðr þ pÞ.
The individual (household) maximizes the




E UðtÞ½  ¼ 
1
t ln cðj; vÞ½ e
 ρþpð ÞðvtÞdv; (15)
where E[.] refers to the expected value, and
epðvtÞ is the probability of being alive at time v,
provided that the person was alive at time t.
The households’ budget constraint is similar to
equation (2) with two exceptions. First, it does not
contain the growth rate of population because of
the absence of intergenerational links. Second, the
returns on assets are the sum of the interest rate
and the annuity. Thus, we have
_aðj; vÞ ¼ ð1 τAÞðrðvÞ þ pÞaðj; vÞ
þ ð1 τWÞwðvÞ  cðj; vÞ (16)
Based on equations (15) and (16), the optimal
path of an individual’s consumption is
_cðj; vÞ
cðj; vÞ
¼ ð1 τAÞðrðvÞ þ pÞ  ðρþ pÞ
¼ rneðvÞ  ðρþ pÞ; (17)
where rneðvÞ ¼ ð1 τAÞðrðvÞ þ pÞ is the net effec-
tive interest rate at time v, which adjusts both for
the tax rate and the risk premium resulting from
death. Solving equation (16) and taking into
account the transversality condition, we obtain











where rneðvÞ ¼ 
v
t rneðsÞds=ðv tÞ. Solving equa-
tion (17) and substituting for c(j,v) in equation
(18), we arrive at the present consumption of the
individual born at time j:
cðj; tÞ ¼ ðρþ pÞðaðj; tÞ þ ð1 τWÞwðtÞÞ; (19)
where wðtÞ is the present value of the individual’s
future wage incomes.
Aggregating equation (19) over the population
and differentiating it with respect to time yields








In steady state, _̂c ¼ 0; thus, equation (20) provides
the following relationship between steady-state
consumption and assets ð̂c; âÞ:
ĉ ¼
xâ





Þ  δ þ pÞ  ðρþ pÞ  g
;
(21)
where x ¼ ðρþ pÞðpþ nÞ and â ¼ k̂ þ b̂. The
equation of motion for public debt is as follows:
_BðtÞ ¼ rðtÞBðtÞ þ GðtÞ  τWWðtÞ
 τAðrðtÞ þ pÞðKðtÞ þ BðtÞÞ
¼ rðtÞBðtÞ  ΓBðtÞ; (22)
where ΓB ¼ τWW þ τAðr þ pÞðK þ BÞ  G. The
only difference between equations (4) and (22) is
the additional tax revenue term ðτApAÞ in equation
(22), thanks to the higher rate of return on assets in
the Blanchard model. Following the same steps as in
section 2, the intertemporal budget constraint of the
government can be expressed as follows:7
B tð Þ ¼
ð1
t
eðrne vð ÞpÞv τwW vð Þ þ τA r vð Þ þ pð ÞK vð Þ  G vð Þ½ dv
Note, that the discount rate in the intertemporal
budget constraint is lower by the p mortality rate in




the case of the government compared to the case of
households. The underlying reason is that the time
horizons of the two actors differ from each other:
contrary to the households, the time horizon of the
government continues to be infinite.







r  g  n
(23)
The dynamics of the system is determined by
equations (6),(20) and (22).8 The steady state is
described by equations (8), (21) and (23).
Substituting equation (8) for ĉ and μf ðk̂Þ for
b̂ in equation (21), we arrive at the following
alternative expression for the long-run debt-to-
GDP ratio after some manipulation:
















The advantage of equation (24) over equation
(23) is that in the former case the steady-state
debt-to-GDP ratio is expressed solely as a func-
tion of the steady-state physical capital per
effective labour, which is of first-order impor-
tance from our point of view. Namely, the cru-
cial step with regard to the derivation of the
crowding-out effect is the differentiation of the
debt-to-GDP ratio (equation.24) with respect to
the physical capital per effective labour:
@μ
@k̂





































Because the sign of the derivative in equation (25)
is negative, an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio
leads to lower steady-state capital and vice versa.9
Thus, public debt crowds out physical capital and
reduces long-run output in the Blanchard model
as opposed to the RCK model. This crucial result
was already documented by Blanchard (1985).
Equation (25) proves not only the existence of
crowding out but is also appropriate to determine
its magnitude. The calculation requires the speci-
fication of the production function. Therefore, in
what follows, we assume a Cobb–Douglas produc-
tion function: ŷ ¼ k̂α, where 0 < α < 1. With this
end in view, multiplying equation (25) by k̂ and
taking into account that f ðk̂Þ  k̂f 0ðk̂Þ ¼ ŵ, and
f 00ðk̂Þ ¼ αð1 αÞ ŷ
k̂2
, we arrive at the basic





























Equation (26) shows the percentage point change
in the debt-to-GDP ratio due to a one per cent
change in the capital per effective labour. This is
the inverse of the crowding-out effect of public
debt (Φ). Considering the latter and the fact that
Δŷ=ŷ ¼ αΔk̂=k̂ in the case of a Cobb–Douglas
production function, we can calculate the burden









¼ α Φ (27)
Blanchard and Fischer (1989) were the first to
derive a closed-form solution to the crowding-
out effect in the Blanchard model. However, they
worked with lump-sum taxes and determined the
@K=@B marginal effect instead of the percentage
effect of the debt-to-GDP ratio on long-run out-
put. Consequently, their formula is inappropriate
to perform easy and direct calculations on the
burden of public debt.
In what follows, we calculate the long-run output
loss of public debt based on real data according to
equations (26) and (27). The sample covers the period
of the ‘great moderation’ (2000–2007) and incorpo-
rates the 167 countries of the PennWorld Table 8.0.10















 > 0; f 00ðk̂










10We neglect the years of the global crisis because the crowding-out effect cannot prevail in a balance sheet recession (Krugman 2012). Nevertheless, the
results are robust to the sample period.
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To obtain robust results, the calculations are per-
formed for six country groups and for six countries
as well. The individual countries under consideration
are the USA, the United Kingdom (UK), Japan (JPN),
Germany (GER), Italy (ITA) and France (FRA). The
six groups of countries are the OECD countries, the
Eurozone (EURO), the low-income countries (LIC),
the lower-middle-income countries (LMIC), the
upper-middle-income countries (UMIC) and finally
the high-income countries (HIC). In the last four
cases, the 167 countries are grouped according to the
income classification of the World Bank. During the
calculations, we use the median values of the indivi-
dual variables in the investigated period.
The inputs and the results of the calculations are
presented in Table 1. According to our results,
neither the magnitude of the crowding out of phy-
sical capital nor the resulting loss in the long-run
output are significant. The calculations show that a
one percentage point change in the debt-to-GDP
ratio reduces the steady-state per capita output
only by 0.008–0.032 per cent throughout the sample.
The conclusions of the Blanchard model in rela-
tion to the crowding-out effect of public debt are
reasonable. The presence of the crowding out of
physical capital is due to the lack of intergenerational
links and the finite horizon of households. Namely,
the finite horizon assumption implies that a deficit-
financed temporary tax cut increases not just the
actual income but to some extent the present value
of lifetime income as well. Moreover, because of the
absence of intergenerational links, the future tax
burden of the present deficit financing will fall to
some extent on new households (generations) from
which current households (generations) feel them-
selves disconnected.11 The negligible magnitude of
the crowding-out effect can also be explained.
Although individuals maximize their utility during
their lifetimes, the time horizon is very long; a mini-
mum of 30–40 years even if we correct for inactive
years. This means that although government bonds
are net wealth for households, as equation (21) sug-
gests, at best they affect the yearly permanent
income only marginally.
To test the robustness of our results, we per-
form sensitivity analyses with respect to the capital
tax rate, the depreciation rate, the debt-to-GDP
ratio and the expected lifetime. The robustness
check with respect to the latter is inspired by the
key idea that, ‘If we think of 1/p as the horizon
index, we can choose it anywhere between zero
and infinity and study the effects of the horizon of
agents on the behaviour of the economy’
(Blanchard 1985, 224). The underlying country
group of the sensitivity analyses is the Eurozone.
The results are presented in Figure 2. These results
show that the crowding-out effect is robust to the
debt-to-GDP ratio and the tax rate, whereas it is
moderately sensitive to the depreciation rate and
the horizon index in the Blanchard model.
However, in the latter cases, the magnitude of
the crowding-out effect continues to remain neg-
ligible throughout the entire interval of the depre-
ciation rate and throughout the reasonable
interval (i.e. 1/p > 10–15) of the horizon index.
To illustrate the magnitude of the crowding-out
effect in the Blanchard model, we calculate the
burden of public debt at a 90 per cent debt-to-
GDP ratio. Because the crowding-out effect is not
sensitive to B/Y, the total impact on output can be
calculated by multiplying the marginal burden of
debt (αΦ) by the debt-to-GDP ratio:
Δŷ=ŷ ¼ 0:9  ð0:032Þ ¼ 0:0288.12 According
to this calculation, we can conclude that the rise
of the debt-to-GDP ratio from zero to 90 per cent
reduces the long-run output – via the classical
crowding-out channel – by approximately 2–3
per cent. The distortionary taxation related to
public debt does not change the picture.
Contrary to the RCK model, it is impossible to
calculate analytically the output loss related to
distortionary taxes in the Blanchard model.13
Nevertheless, we can suppose that the magnitudes
are similar in the two models. Thus, taking into
account the results of the appendix, we can con-
clude that the total output loss of a 90 per cent
debt-to-GDP ratio – including both the effects of
distortionary taxes and classical crowding out –
11Technically, the reason for the net wealth effect of public debt is the lower discount rate in the intertemporal budget constraint of the government
compared to the case of households (Blanchard 1985).
12To provide a pessimistic estimation, we use the largest marginal impact on output in Table 1.
13The obstacle is that in the Blanchard model the interest rate cannot be expressed as the sole function of the model parameters, in sharp contrast to the
RCK model (see the derivation of equation (A5) in the appendix).
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Table 1. The crowding-out effect of public debt for different countries and country groups.
LIC LMIC UMIC HIC OECD EURO USA JPN UK GER ITA FRA Source/Calculation
ρ 0.037 0.045 0.067 0.046 0.038 0.036 0.027 0.022 0.061 0.029 0.024 0.023 equation (24)
τA 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 calibration
1/p 32.8 45.0 52.0 58.0 58.6 58.4 57.2 61.8 58.6 58.5 60.5 59.7 WDI
p 0.030 0.022 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
n 0.027 0.018 0.012 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.010 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.007 PWT 8.0
g 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 calibration
δ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 calibration
bw=by 0.617 0.532 0.462 0.561 0.592 0.589 0.650 0.529 0.633 0.638 0.539 0.629 PWT 8.0
bk=by 2.563 3.066 2.973 3.013 3.046 3.156 2.999 4.221 2.251 3.081 4.002 3.347 PWT 8.0
bb=by 0.800 0.614 0.448 0.441 0.477 0.519 0.611 1.751 0.470 0.649 1.055 0.637 HPDD
bc=by 0.742 0.712 0.634 0.561 0.577 0.584 0.728 0.543 0.686 0.600 0.588 0.601 PWT 8.0
bb=bc 1.078 0.862 0.707 0.786 0.827 0.889 0.839 3.227 0.686 1.081 1.794 1.059 ðb̂

=ŷÞ=ðĉ=ŷÞ
bk=bc 3.452 4.305 4.691 5.370 5.282 5.403 4.118 7.779 3.282 5.131 6.804 5.567 ðk̂

=ŷÞ=ð̂c=ŷÞ









=@bk 0.149 0.153 0.181 0.146 0.134 0.130 0.117 0.112 0.163 0.117 0.115 0.111 α ŷ=k̂

 
1/Φ −15.523 −18.280 −16.886 −25.961 −29.936 −32.115 −36.859 −40.031 −32.995 −44.921 −32.426 −37.082 equation (26)
Φ −0.064 −0.055 −0.059 −0.039 −0.033 −0.031 −0.027 −0.025 −0.030 −0.022 −0.031 −0.027
@by=by
@μ
−0.025 −0.026 −0.032 −0.017 −0.014 −0.013 −0.009 −0.012 −0.011 −0.008 −0.014 −0.010 equation (27)
Notes: The data in the table are the medians for the individual panels and time series in the period of 2000–2007. The sources of the data are the WDI (World Development Indicators, downloaded: 24.06.2014), the PWT
8.0 (Penn World Table 8.0; Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015) and the HPDD (Historical Public Debt Database (2013 Fall vintage) – IMF, Abbas et al. 2010). The subjective discount rate is calculated according to
equation (24). The expected lifetime at birth adjusted for the inactive years is 1/p (expected lifetime – 20). The labour share ðŵ=ŷ ¼ 1 αÞ, the consumption share ðĉ=ŷÞ and the physical capital per output

















probably does not exceed 5–6 per cent in the
Blanchard model. Consequently, the burden of
public debt is not a serious concern in that
model either.
Our conclusion is in line with Evans (1991), who
was the first to prove that Ricardian equivalence is a
good approximation in the Blanchard model.
Nevertheless, the approximate neutrality of fiscal pol-
icy in the Blanchard model can hinge crucially upon
the absence of some relevant life-cycle aspects of
households’ behaviour. In fact, the basic Blanchard
model with age-independentmortality rate andwages
can be considered rather as a model of dynasties with
finite horizon than as a classical OLGmodel. Faruqee,
Laxton, and Symansky (1997) and Faruqee and
Laxton (2000) show that if wages follow a hump-
shaped life-cycle pattern then the burden of public
debt can be considerable in the Blanchard model as
well. In another paper, Faruqee (2003) arrives at the
same conclusion by introducing a death probability,
which increases with the age. According to these
papers the long-run output loss of a 90 per cent
debt-to-GDP ratio can be posited between 5 and 10
per cent. However, the exact value is very sensitive to
the parameter calibration.14 So, we decided not to
depart from the basic Blanchard framework.
Moreover, in the next section, the Solow model also
delivers output losses in the range of 5–10 per cent for
developed countries at a 90 per cent debt-to-GDP
ratio. Consequently, the main policy conclusion of
the paper with regard to the upper boundary of the
burden of public debt is unaffected by these potential
modifications of the basic Blanchard framework.
IV. Government debt in the Solow model with
human capital
The dynamic optimization of households and the
underlying permanent income hypothesis can be
heavily challenged on both theoretical and empiri-
cal grounds (Romer 2012). The central assump-
tion of the permanent income hypothesis is that
households base their consumption decision on
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Figure 2. The sensitivity of the crowding-out effect and the resulting output loss in the Eurozone.
Notes: The calculations are based on equations (26) and (27). The variables and the parameters take on the values of the Eurozone in each case (Table 1)
14For example, in Faruqee and Laxton (2000), the burden of public debt decreases with the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and becomes similar to
the results of the basic Blanchard model as log-utility is reached.
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of their current income. However, many empirical
studies find a strong positive correlation between
current income and consumption (e.g. Caroll and
Summers 1991). Furthermore, some studies find
that predictable changes in income lead to pre-
dictable changes in consumption at the time that
they happen (Johnson, Parker, and Souleles 2006;
Shapiro and Slemrod 2003).
Because of the objections raised against the
permanent income hypothesis, we drop the
assumption of dynamically optimizing house-
holds in this section and switch to the tradi-
tional consumption theory, which assumes that
households base their consumption on their cur-
rent disposable income and follow a rule-of-
thumb decision. This implies practically that
we study the impact of public debt on steady-
state output in the framework of the Solow
model with a constant and exogenous household
saving rate. The constant, exogenous saving rate
of households implies that government deficit
reduces aggregate savings – and thereby invest-
ments as well – one-to-one in the extreme.
Therefore, in this section, we consider the case
of a complete crowding-out effect in the tradi-
tion of Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999).
In addition to the underlying consumption
behaviour, a further departure from the RCK
and the Blanchard models is that we take
human capital into account. Our primary reason
for the latter is that the presence of human
capital affects the burden of public debt in a
quantitatively important way in the Solow
model.15
The discussion is based on the human capital
augmented Solow model of Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil (1992). The production function is
Y ¼ KαHβðELÞ1αβ;
where H is human capital, α; β > 0 and αþ β < 1.












lnðnþ g þ δÞ; (28)
where sK and sH are the saving (investment) rates
in relation to physical and human capital,
respectively.
To calculate the burden of public debt, we have
to rearrange equation (28) in such a way that it
already does contain the debt-to-GDP ratio (Dedák
and Dombi 2018). In this derivation, the first step is
to calculate the effect of the budget balance on the
aggregate saving rate. The aggregate savings is the
sum of private savings and government savings (i.e.
the budget balance). For simplicity, it is assumed
that government savings influences only the accu-
mulation of physical capital:
sK ¼ sKP  d (29)
where sKP is the savings of the private sector com-
pared to the output. As we assume complete crowd-
ing out, private savings is unaffected by government
savings. The budget deficit can be given as a constant
z fraction of private savings: d ¼ z  sKP. Parallel
with the latter, equation (29) can be reformulated
as sK ¼ ð1 zÞsKP. Substituting this new formula
for sK in equation (28) and using the fact that lnð1
zÞ  z if z is close to zero, the long-run output can
be rewritten as follows:




þ Ψ3 lnðnþ g þ δÞ; (30)
where Ψ1 ¼ α1αβ , Ψ2 ¼
β
1αβ and Ψ3 ¼
 αþβ1αβ : Substituting equation (9) for d in equa-
tion (30), we arrive at the formula of the long-run
output - debt relationship:
15The inclusion of human capital into the RCK model and the Blanchard model would have complicated the discussion of the previous sections considerably,
without improving our understanding. First, the net wealth effect of government bonds continues to be zero in the RCK model with human capital as well.
Second, the tiny magnitudes of the crowding-out effect calculated in section 3 suggest that the inclusion of human capital into the Blanchard model is
quantitatively not an important issue.
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lnðŷÞ ¼ Ψ1 lnðsKPÞ  Ψ4μ
 þ Ψ2 lnðsHÞ
þ Ψ3 lnðnþ g þ δÞ ;




The most important message of equation (31) is that
the coefficient of μ* is not constant but changes with
the private sector’s saving rate, the population
growth rate, the technology growth rate and the
parameters of the production function.16 Note that
the coefficient is negative, so public debt reduces
long-run output. The magnitude of output loss
decreases with the private sector’s saving rate and
increases with the population growth rate. The intui-
tive explanation is the following (Dedák and Dombi
2018). If the saving rate of the private sector is high,
then the budget deficit necessary to maintain a given
debt-to-GDP ratio decreases the aggregate saving
rate only modestly in percentage terms and hence
leads to small changes in steady-state output.
Furthermore, according to equation (9), a higher
population growth rate allows a higher government
deficit for a given debt-to-GDP ratio, thereby redu-
cing the aggregate saving rate and output.
In the following, we calculate the effect of a 90 per
cent debt-to-GDP ratio on long-run output according
to equation (31). Figures 3 and 4 present the results
based on standard parameter calibration. As Figure 3
shows, themarginal effect of public debt decreases (in
absolute value) with the saving rate of the private
sector and so does the burden of public debt as well.
For example, in the case of a 15 per cent private saving
rate,  ψ4 ¼ 0:167, which means that a one per-
centage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio
reduces the long-run output by 0.167 per cent. In
this case, the total loss of output emanating from a
90 per cent debt-to-GDP ratio is 15 per cent. In
contrast, at higher saving rates, the output loss is
much smaller.
The results in Figure 4 show that the marginal
effect of public debt increases (in absolute value)
with the population growth rate and so does the
burden of public debt as well. For example, if the
private saving rate is 20 per cent,  ψ4 ¼ 0:2 at
n ¼ 0:02. In this case, the total loss of output ema-
nating from a 90 per cent debt-to-GDP ratio is 18 per
cent. In contrast, at lower population growth rates
this value is much lower.
Note that Figures 3 and 4 are partial analyses
because they only investigate the effect of one vari-
able on the burden of public debt. However, in
reality, the ceteris paribus condition does not hold.
It is well known that output correlates positively
with the saving rate and negatively with the popula-
tion growth rate (Durlauf, Jonhson, and Temple
Figure 3. The burden of a 90% debt-to-GDP ratio as a function
of the private saving rate.
Notes: The g, α, and β parameters are calibrated according to Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil (1992). The total output loss is calculated as follows:
 100  0:9  ðψ4Þ
Figure 4. The burden of a 90% debt-to-GDP ratio as a function
of the population growth rate.
Notes: The g, α, and β parameters are calibrated according to Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil (1992). The total output loss is calculated as follows:
 100  0:9  ðψ4Þ
16If human capital is absent (β = 0), Ψ1 is lower, implying a smaller debt coefficient in absolute value. The difference can be considerable. For example, if
α ¼ β =1/3, Ψ4 is twice as high with human capital than without human capital.
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2005). Consequently, the least developed countries
are usually characterized by low saving rates and
high population growth rates. This implies that the
burden of public debt is under double pressure in
these countries and can be significantly higher than
Figures 3 and 4 might suggest. For example, if the
private saving rate is only 15 per cent, while the
population growth rate is 2 per cent, the coefficient
of public debt is −0.267 in equation (31), implying a
total output loss of 24 per cent at a 90 per cent debt-
to-GDP ratio.
To sum up, we can conclude that in the Solow
model with a constant saving rate of households
and with complete crowding out of physical capi-
tal, the burden of public debt can be remarkably
different across countries. In developed countries
with high saving rates and low population growth
rates, public debt has only a minor impact on the
steady-state output. However, in the least devel-
oped countries, which are typically characterized
by low saving rates and high population growth
rates, the burden of public debt is vast and redu-
cing government indebtedness could improve
steady-state output significantly. These results
are in line with the most recent findings of the
empirical literature (e.g. Eberhardt and
Presbitero 2015; Ramos-Herrera and Sosvilla-
Rivero 2017).
V. A general framework for the burden of
public debt in neoclassical growth models
The specific framework used in the previous
section can easily be extended to a general
one embracing all kinds of neoclassical growth
models in terms of households’ saving beha-
viour. The key insight is to incorporate a reac-
tion function into the original Solow
framework that reflects the responsiveness of
households’ saving to the budget deficit
through a moveable parameter (Dedák and
Dombi 2018). Let’s denote this responsiveness
parameter by q with the following content:
q ¼ @I=@D, where I is investments and D is
the budget deficit in absolute term. Note, that q
represents the extent to which budget deficit
crowds out investments and is limited to the
interval of [0; 1]. Conversely, (1-q) reflects how
private savings react to the budget deficit.
Based on the latter, a possible reaction function
of private savings to the budget deficit can be
constructed as follows:
sKP ¼ sKP þ ð1 qÞd; (32)
where sKP is the autonomous savings of house-
holds independent of the budget balance com-
pared to output, and the second part of the
function expresses the impact of the budget deficit
on private savings.
Equation (32) is capable of mimicking the
whole spectrum of households’ reactions on the
budget deficit by calibrating the q parameter
accordingly. For instance, if q = 0, the budget
deficit increases private savings by its own amount
and therefore leaves aggregate savings (equa-
equation.29.) unaffected. This is the case of
Ricardian equivalence. In contrast, if q = 1, private
savings do not react to the budget deficit at all,
and therefore aggregate savings are decreased by
the budget deficit one in one. Complete crowding
out of physical capital holds in the latter case.
Setting the value of q between these two extremes
accordingly, the full array of households’ saving
behaviour concerning the budget deficit can be
mapped.
Substituting equation (32) into equation (29),
and assuming that the budget deficit can be given
as a constant z fraction of the autonomous private
savings now (d ¼ z sKP), we can go through all
the steps outlined between equation (29) and (31)
to arrive at the general equation of the burden of
public debt:
lnðŷÞ ¼ Ψ1 lnðsKPÞ  Ψ4μ
 þ Ψ2 lnðsHÞ
þ Ψ3 lnðnþ g þ δÞ; (33)
where Ψ4 ¼ Ψ1
gþn
sKP
q . Equation (33) represents the
general relationship between steady-state output and
public debt independent of whatever assumptions
on households’ consumption behaviour are made.
Depending on the calibration of q, this equation is
capable of delivering the results of all neoclassical
models on the burden of public debt. If the respon-
siveness parameter is set to zero, the coefficient of
the debt/GDP ratio in equation (33) becomes zero
too, corresponding to the case of the RCK model in
which public debt does not imply any output loss.
On the other hand, if q is set to one we arrive at
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equation (31), which is the case of the Solowmodel.-
17 Beyond these two extreme cases, the closer q is set
to zero the more intergenerational links and
dynamic optimization characterize households’
behaviour and the smaller the burden of debt is.18
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the decrease in the burden
of public debt at a debt-to-GDP ratio of 90 per cent
in parallel with the transmission of the responsive-
ness parameter (crowding out intensity) from one to
zero. It is impressive how remarkably the long-run
output loss of being indebted decreases with q.
Finally, we note that equation (33) has a special
appeal. It can serve as a basis for structural regres-
sions in empirical estimations. To date, namely, the
empirical literature has mostly operated with arbi-
trarily constructed growth–debt regressions lacking
any thorough underpinning by growth theory.19
VI. Conclusions
This paper investigated the impact of public debt on
capital accumulation and long-run output in the fra-
mework of neoclassical growth models with exogen-
ous technological change. Regarding the effect of
fiscal policy, the principal question is how the differ-
ent methods of financing government expenditures
affect the consumption decisions of households. The
more dynamic optimization and intergenerational
links characterize consumer behaviour, the less public
debt affects long-run output. Because the empirics do
not support any consumption theory unambiguously,
we considered three different cases: two extremes and
an intermediate one. The RCK model is one of the
well-known extreme cases in which Ricardian equiva-
lence holds, at least when taxes are lump-sum.
Although, if taxes are distortionary, public debt
decreases long-run output in the RCK model too,
but the burden remains rather small, amounting to
a few percentage points only.
The Blanchard model represents the intermedi-
ate case in which no intergenerational links are
present but consumption behaviour is still gov-
erned by dynamic optimization. Because of the
lack of intergenerational links, public debt affects
the consumption of households directly and
results in lower steady-state physical capital and
output. However, the magnitudes of the crowding-
out effect and the related output loss are negligi-
ble. For example, the increase in the debt-to-GDP
ratio from zero to 90 per cent lowers the steady-
state output only by 2–3 per cent via the classical
Figure 5. The total output loss at a 90% debt-to-GDP ratio as a
function of households' consumption behaviour and the auton-
omous private saving rate
Notes: Total output loss is calculated as follows: ð100  0:9  ψ4Þ. The g,
α, and β parameters are set as in Figures 3 and 4. In Figure 5,
n ¼ 0:005. In Figure 6, sKP ¼ 0:20.
Figure 6. The total output loss at a 90% debt-to-GDP ratio as a
function of households' consumption behaviour and the popu-
lation growth rate
Notes: Total output loss is calculated as follows: ð100  0:9  ψ4Þ.
The g, α, and β parameters are set as in Figures 3 and 4. In
Figure 5, n ¼ 0:005. In Figure 6, sKP ¼ 0:20.
17Note, that if q = 1, sKP ¼ sKP:
18Note, that a q close to zero corresponds to the Blanchard model.
19See Panizza and Presbitero (2013) for a survey.
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crowding-out channel. Taking the effect of distor-
tionary taxes also into account does not change
the picture: the burden of debt remains low, prob-
ably under 5–6 per cent.
The other extreme case of consumption beha-
viour is represented by the Solow model, in which
households save a constant fraction of their
income. Under such a condition, the crowding-
out effect of public debt is complete. This implies
that the Solow model serves as a means to calcu-
late the upper boundary of the burden of public
debt. Our results show that in countries with a
high saving rate and with a low population growth
rate, conditions typical for developed countries,
the impact of public debt on steady-state output
is modest. For example, if the private sector’s
saving rate is 25 per cent and the population
growth rate is 0.5 per cent, the increase in the
debt-to-GDP ratio from zero to 90 per cent lowers
the steady-state output only by 9 per cent. In
contrast, the burden of public debt is much higher
under the conditions of the least developed coun-
tries with low saving rates and high population
growth rates.
Finally, by developing a general framework for
assessing the burden of public debt, the message of
neoclassical growth theory becomes even more
apparent: if Ricardian equivalence fails, the enor-
mous differences in the saving and population
growth rates observed across the world lead to
huge differences in output loss caused by public
debt. The greater the departure from Ricardian
equivalence the wider the scale on which the bur-
den of debt may vary.
Our analysis relies on a neoclassical frame-
work with exogenous technological change.
Lifting the restriction of exogenous technological
development, the quantitative results on the bur-
den of public debt may alter to some extent. In
this respect, the extension of our general frame-
work to incorporate endogenous technological
change seems to be especially promising and is
the subject of future research. Despite this
caveat, our results are already established enough
to draw some cautious conclusions for European
economic policies. Since the burden of public
debt in developed countries seems to be rather
small – even in the case of significant departure
from Ricardian equivalence – the paying down
of debt to pre-crisis levels would probably not
improve much the growth performance of
European economies. Therefore, regarding the
lingering and fragile recovery of the Eurozone,
economic policies striving to slash government
indebtedness significantly in the years to come
seems to be neither advisable nor desirable. This
conclusion holds despite the fact that debt-sus-
tainability is certainly a major source of concern
in some highly-indebted European countries.
However, in the recent years budget deficits
have become moderate all over Europe, so cur-
rently the primary risk concerning debt-sustain-
ability is not loose fiscal policies but sluggish
economic growth.
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Appendix
The effect of public debt on steady-state output
through distortionary taxes
In order to quantify the effect of public debt on long-
run output through distortionary taxation, we use
the framework of the RCK model presented in sec-
tion 2. The differences compared to section 2 are
twofold. First, the tax rates of wage income and
capital income are set to be equal for mathematical
convenience. Second, the production function takes
the Cobb–Douglas form. Considering the above, the
steady state and the equilibrium of the economy are
described partly by the following equations (aster-
isks are neglected):
ŷ ¼ ðk̂Þα (A:1)















τrBþ τW þ τrK  Gð Þ=Y
r  ðg þ nÞ
¼
τrμþ τ  τδk̂=ŷ ϕ
r  ðg þ nÞ
(A:4)
Equations (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) are equivalent to
equations (7), (3) and (9), respectively. The last
term in equation (A.4) takes into account
that Y ¼ W þ rK þ δK.
Substituting equation (A.2) and equation
(A.3) for r and k̂=ŷ in equation (A.4), we arrive
at a quadratic equation in the tax rate after
some manipulation:
ðδ  δαÞτ2 þ ððα μρþ μn ϕ 1Þδ  ρ gÞτþ
þðμρ μnþ ϕþ μg þ μδÞρþ ðg þ δÞðϕ μnÞ ¼ 0:
(A:5)
The solution of equation (A.5) delivers the tax
rate, which is consistent with the targeted μ debt-
to-GDP ratio. After the determination of the tax
rate, the calculations of the steady-state interest
rate, capital-output ratio and output per effective
labour are straightforward, according to equations
(A.1), (A.2) and (A.3). Appendix A1 presents the
results of the calculations for different debt-to-
GDP ratios based on the typical parameter settings
for developed countries.20
As can be seen in Appendix A1, the tax rate
increases with the long-run debt-to-GDP ratio.
The underlying reason is the need to achieve a
higher primary budget surplus in order to main-
tain a higher debt-to-GDP ratio. The increment in
the tax rate compared to the μ ¼ 0 case can be
interpreted as the tax burden of public debt. The
consequences of the higher tax rate are the higher
interest rate and, thus, the lower capital and out-
put. Although public debt reduces the long-run
output due to tax distortions, our results show
that this effect is not important from a quantita-
tive point of view. For example, if the long-run
debt-to-GDP ratio jumps from 0 to 90 per cent,
the tax rate and the interest rate increase only by
2.8 and 0.7 percentage points, respectively. In
accordance with these rather small movements,
the steady-state output decreases only by 2.75 per
cent.
We performed an extended robustness analy-
sis and found that the output loss of public debt
triggered by distortionary taxation is sensitive to
the n, α, ϕ and ρ parameters. The results show
that the output loss decreases with the popula-
tion growth rate and increases with the subjec-
tive discount rate, the capital share and the
government expenditures relative to GDP.
However, as Appendix A2 demonstrates, the
magnitudes remain small. Another tendency to
be observed is that the output loss is larger for
those parameter combinations which are more
typical for less developed countries (grey-
coloured fields).21
20The tax rate corresponds to the smaller root of equation (A.5), because the larger root is above one in each case.
21The results are similar when human capital and consumption tax are included in the model.
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Appendix A1. The effect of public debt on steady-state output through distortionary taxes.
n ¼ 0; α ¼ 0:4; δ ¼ 0:04; g ¼ 0:02; ϕ ¼ 0:45; ρ ¼ 0:03
μ* (%) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
τ (%) 50.7 51 51.4 51.7 52 52.3 52.6 52.9 53.2 53.5 53.8
r* (%) 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.8
k̂=ŷ 2.827 2.814 2.801 2.789 2.776 2.763 2.750 2.737 2.724 2.711 2.698
ŷ 1.999 1.993 1.987 1.981 1.975 1.969 1.963 1.957 1.951 1.944 1.938
Tax burden of public debt (ppt) 0.0 0.3 0.7 1 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1
Output loss (%) 0.00 0.30 0.60 0.91 1.21 1.51 1.82 2.13 2.44 2.75 3.06
Notes: ‘ppt’ stands for percentage points. The tax burden is calculated as follows: ðτ  τμ¼0Þ. The output loss is calculated as follows:
 100ðŷ  ŷμ¼0Þ=ŷ

μ¼0
Appendix A2. The sensitivity of the output loss related to the tax burden of μ* = 90 (%).
n α ϕ ρ
Partial
Sensitivity 0.01 0.02 0.35 0.45 0.50 0.35 0.40 0.50 0.02 0.04 0.05

























1.39 5.97 0.88 2.86 1.99 3.95 0.78 2.92
Notes: The results of the joint sensitivity analysis are coloured grey if the underlying parameter combination is more typical for less developed countries than
for developed ones.
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